Unawareness, beliefs and games by Aviad Heifetz & Martin Meier
Unawareness, Beliefs and Games∗
Aviad Heifetz† Martin Meier‡ Burkhard C. Schipper§
March 1, 2007
Abstract
We deﬁne a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic
beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unaware-
ness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, deﬁne equilibrium, and prove existence.
We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and
restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure
to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all
states. Yet, we prove a generalized “No-trade” theorem according to which there can not
be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of
the “No-agreeing-to-disagree” theorem.
Keywords: unawareness, awareness, type-space, Bayesian games, incomplete information,
equilibrium, common prior, agreement, speculative trade, interactive epistemology.
JEL-Classiﬁcations: C70, C72, D80, D82.
∗Martin acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci´ on y Ciencia via a Ramon
y Cajal Fellowship and Research Grant SEJ2004-07861, as well as from Barcelona Economics (XREA), while
Burkhard received ﬁnancial support from the NSF SES-0647811, DFG SFB/TR 15, Minerva Stiftung, and IGA-
UCD. We thank Leandro Chaves Rˆ ego, Enrique Kawamura, Salvatore Modica, Klaus Nehring and participants
in the Workshop on Unawareness, Stanford University, 2006, NASEM 2006, LOFT 2006, LAMES 2006, and
seminars at UCLA and Venice for helpful comments.
†The Economics and Management Department, The Open University of Israel. Email: aviadhe@openu.ac.il
‡Instituto de An´ alisis Econ´ omico - CSIC, Barcelona. Email: martin.meier@uab.es
§Department of Economics, University of California, Davis. Email: bcschipper@ucdavis.edu1 Introduction
Unawareness is probably the most common and most important kind of ignorance. Business
people invest most of their time not in updating prior beliefs, and crossing out states of the
world that they previously assumed to be possible. Rather, their eﬀorts are mostly aimed at
exploring unmapped terrain, trying to ﬁgure out business opportunities that they could not even
have spelled out before. More broadly, every book we read, every new acquaintance we make,
expands our horizon and our language, by fusing it with the horizons of those we encounter,
turning the world more intelligible and more meaningful to us than it was before (Gadamer,
1960).
With this in mind, we should not be surprised that the standard state spaces aimed at
modeling knowledge or certainty are not adequate for capturing unawareness (Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichini, 2001). Indeed, more elaborate models are needed (Fagin and Halpern, 1988,
Modica and Rustichini, 1994, 1999, Halpern, 2001). In all of these models, the horizon of
propositions the individual has in her disposition to talk about the world is always a genuine
part of the description of the state of aﬀairs.
Things become even more intricate when several players are involved. Diﬀerent players may
not only have diﬀerent languages. On top of this, each player may also form a belief on the
extent to which other players are aware of the issues that she herself has in mind. And the
complexity continues further, because the player may be uncertain as to the sub-language that
each other player attributes to her or to others; and so on.
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a) showed how an unawareness structure consisting of
a lattice of spaces is adequate for modeling mutual unawareness. Every space in the lattice
captures one particular horizon of meanings or propositions. Higher spaces capture wider
horizons, in which states correspond to situations described by a richer vocabulary. The join
of several spaces – the lowest space at least as high as every one of them – corresponds to the
fusion of the horizons of meanings expressible in these spaces.
In a companion work (Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2006b), we showed the precise sense
in which such unawareness structures are adequate and general enough for modeling mutual
unawareness. We put forward an axiom system, which extends to the multi-player case a variant
of the axiom system of Modica and Rustichini (1999). We then showed how the collections of all
maximally-consistent sets of formulas in our system form a canonical unawareness structure.1 In
a parallel work, Halpern and Rˆ ego (2005) devised another sound and complete axiomatization
for our class of unawareness structures.
In this paper we extend unawareness structures so as to encompass probabilistic beliefs
(Section 2) rather than only knowledge or ignorance. The deﬁnition of types (Deﬁnition 1),
and the way beliefs relate across diﬀerent spaces of the lattice, is a non-trivial modiﬁcation of
the coherence conditions for knowledge operators in unawareness structures, as formulated in
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a).
With unawareness type spaces in hand, we can deﬁne Bayesian games. Here again, the
deﬁnition of a strategy is not obvious. Consider a type τ with a narrow horizon, and two other
1Each space in the lattice of this canonical unawareness structure consists of the maximally consistent sets of
formulas in a sub-language generated by a subset of the atomic propositions.
2types τ0,τ00 with a wider horizon, that agree with the quantitative beliefs of τ regarding the
aspects of reality of which τ is aware; the beliefs of τ0 and τ00 diﬀer only concerning dimensions
of reality that τ does not conceive. Should the action taken by τ necessarily be some average
of the actions taken by τ0 and τ00? We believe that conceptually, the answer to this question is
negative. When the player conceives of more parameters (e.g. motives for saving) as relevant
to her decision, her optimal action (e.g. “invest in bonds” or “invest in stocks”) need not be
related to her optimal decision (e.g. “go shopping”) when that parameter is not part of the
vocabulary with which she conceives the world.2
The next step is to deﬁne Bayesian equilibrium. With ﬁnitely or countably many states,
existence follows from standard arguments.3 Unawareness, however, introduces a new aspect to
the construction of equilibrium, namely “the tyranny of the unaware”: A type who concieves of
only few dimensions of reality does not have in mind types of other players with a wider horizon,
so the optimal action of this type does not depend on the actions of these wider-horizon types.
Those types, however, who assign a positive probability to this narrow-minded type, must take
its action into account when optimizing.
In Section 4 we deﬁne the notion of a common prior. Conceptually, a prior of a player is
a convex combination of (the beliefs of) her types (see e.g. Samet, 1998). If the priors of the
diﬀerent players coincide, we have a common prior. A prior of a player induces a prior on each
particular space in the lattice, and if the prior is common to the players, the induced prior on
each particular space is common as well.
What are the implications of the existence of a common prior? First, we extend an example
from Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a) and show that speculative trade is compatible with
the existence of a common prior. This need not be surprising if one views unawareness as a
particular kind of delusion, since we know that with deluded beliefs, speculative trade is possible
even with a common prior (Geanakoplos, 1989). Nevertheless, we show that under a mild
non-degeneracy condition, a common prior is not compatible with common certainty of strict
preference to carry out speculative trade. That is, even though types with limited awareness are,
in a particular sense, deluded, a common prior precludes the possibility of common certainty of
the event that based on private information players are willing to engage in a zero-sum bet with
strictly positive subjective gains to everybody. This is so because unaware types are “deluded”
only concerning aspects of the world outside their vocabulary, while a common prior captures
a prior agreement on the likelihood of whatever the players do have a common vocabulary. An
implication of this generalized no-trade theorem is that arbitrary small transaction fees rule
out speculative trade under unawareness. We complement this result be generalizing Aumann’s
(1976) “No-Agreeing-to-disagree” result to unawareness belief structures.
There is a growing literature on unawareness both in economics and computer science. The
independent parallel work of Sadzik (2006) is closest to ours. Building on our earlier work,
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a), he presents a framework of unawareness with probabilis-
tic beliefs in which the common prior on the upmost space is a primitive. In contrast, we take
types as primitives and deﬁne a prior on the entire unawareness belief structure as a convex
2This is a crucial point in which our deﬁnition of a strategy diverges from the one in the parallel work of
Sadzik (2006). This paper conﬁnes attention to a setting with a common prior, that we discuss as a special case.
3Recall that in standard type spaces (with no unawareness), a Bayesian equilibrium need not exist even in
“non-pathological” spaces with a continuum of states (Simon 2003).
3combination of the type’s beliefs. Sadzik (2006) also considers Bayesian games with unaware-
ness, but his deﬁnition of Bayesian strategy and consequently the notion of equilibrium diﬀers
from ours. As argued above, we do not conﬁne actions of a type with a narrow horizon to be
some average of actions of the corresponding types with a wider horizon, a restriction made in
Sadzik (2006). As a result, in our notion of Bayesian equilibrium every type maximizes and is
certain that every other type that she is aware of maximizes as well, while in the equilibrium of
actions proposed in Sadzik (2006) a type may believe that another player is irrational. Sadzik
(2006) does not allow for unawareness of players, while we do (see the appendix).
A purely syntactic framework with unawareness is presented by Feinberg (2004, 2005). He
applies it to games with unawareness of actions but complete information. In the appendix,
we discuss an interesting example due to Feinberg (2005) and demonstrate that higher order
awareness of unawareness in Feinberg (2005) corresponds to higher order belief of unawareness
in our model. In a framework similar to Feinberg (2004, 2005), ˇ Copiˇ c and Galeotti (2006)
study two-player games with either unawareness of actions or unawareness of types (with a
prior as a primitive). Yet, they postulate that in equilibrium beliefs over actions and payoﬀs
must correspond to the true joint distribution over own payoﬀs and the opponent’s actions.
Both Halpern and Rˆ ego (2006) and Li (2006b) present models of extensive form games with
unawareness and analyze solution concepts for them.4 Modica (2000) studies the updating of
probabilities and argues that new information may change posteriors more if it implies also
a higher level of awareness. A dynamic framework for a single decision maker with unaware-
ness is introduced by Grant and Quiggin (2006). Ewerhart (2001) studies the possibility of
agreement under a notion of unawareness diﬀerent from the aforementioned literature. Lastly,
Ahn and Ergin (2006) consider explicitly more or less ﬁne descriptions of acts and characterize
axiomatically a partition-dependent subjective expected utility representation. Since the set
of all partitions of a state-space forms a complete lattice, their approach suggests a decision
theoretic foundation of subjective probabilities on our lattice structure.
In the following section we present our interactive unawareness belief structure. In Section
3 Bayesian games with unawareness are developed. In Section 4 we deﬁne a common prior
and investigate agreement and speculation under unawareness. Some further properties of our
unawareness belief structure are relegated to the appendix, which also contains a generalization
of Bayesian games in order to include unawareness of actions and players. Proofs are relegated
to the appendix as well. In a separate appendix, Meier and Schipper (2007), we extend the
“No-trade” theorem to inﬁnite unawareness structures.
2 Model
2.1 State-Spaces
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a complete lattice of disjoint state-spaces, with the partial order  on S.
If Sα and Sβ are such that Sα  Sβ we say that “Sα is more expressive than Sβ – states of Sα
4Li (2006b) is based on her earlier work, Li (2006a).
4describe situations with a richer vocabulary than states of Sβ ”.5 Denote by Ω =
S
α∈A Sα the
union of these spaces. Each S ∈ S is a measurable space, with a σ-ﬁeld FS.
Spaces in the lattice can be more or less “rich” in terms of facts that may or may not obtain
in them. The partial order relates to the “richness” of spaces. The upmost space of the lattice
can be interpreted as the “objective” state-space. Its states encompass full descriptions from
the point of view of the modeler.
2.2 Projections
For every S and S0 such that S0  S, there is a measurable surjective projection rS0
S : S0 → S,
where rS
S is the identity. (“rS0
S (ω) is the restriction of the description ω to the more limited
vocabulary of S.”) Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of
S0. We require the projections to commute: If S00  S0  S then rS00
S = rS0
S ◦ rS00
S0 . If ω ∈ S0,
denote ωS = rS0
S (ω). If D ⊆ S0, denote DS = {ωS : ω ∈ D}.
Projections “translate” states in “more expressive” spaces to states in “less expressive”
spaces by “erasing” facts that can not be expressed in a lower space.
2.3 Events
Denote g(S) = {S0 : S0  S}. For D ⊆ S, denote D↑ =
S
S0∈g(S)

rS0
S
−1
(D). (“All the
extensions of descriptions in D to at least as expressive vocabularies.”)
An event is a pair (E,S), where E = D↑ with D ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. D is called the base
and S the base-space of (E,S), denoted by S(E). If E 6= ∅, then S is uniquely determined by
E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E,S). Otherwise, we write ∅S for (∅,S). Note that
not every subset of Ω is an event.
Some fact may obtain in a subset of a space. Then this fact should be also “expressible” in
“more expressive” spaces. Therefore the event contains not only the particular subset but also
its inverse images in “more expressive” spaces.
Let Σ be the set of measurable events of Ω, i.e., D↑ such that D ∈ FS, for some state space
S ∈ S.
2.4 Negation
If (D↑,S) is an event where D ⊆ S, the negation ¬(D↑,S) of (D↑,S) is deﬁned by ¬(D↑,S) :=
((S\D)↑,S). Note, that by this deﬁnition, the negation of a (measurable) event is a (measurable)
event. Abusing notation, we write ¬D↑ := (S \ D)↑. Note that by our notational convention,
we have ¬S↑ = ∅S and ¬∅S = S↑, for each space S ∈ S. The event ∅S should be interpreted as
a “logical contradiction phrased with the expressive power available in S.” ¬D↑ is typically a
proper subset of the complement Ω \ D
↑
. That is, (S \ D)
↑ $ Ω \ D
↑
.
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event D↑ is both expressible
5Here and in what follows, phrases within quotation marks hint at intended interpretations, but we emphasize
that these interpretations are not part of the deﬁnition of the set-theoretic structure.
5and valid – these are the states in D↑; there may be states in which this description is expressible
but invalid – these are the states in ¬D↑; and there may be states in which neither this
description nor its negation are expressible – these are the states in
Ω \

D↑ ∪ ¬D↑

= Ω \ S

D↑
↑
.
Thus our structure is not a standard state-space model in the sense of Dekel, Lipman, and
Rustichini (1998).
2.5 Conjunction and Disjunction
If
n
D
↑
λ,Sλ
o
λ∈L
is an at most countable collection of events (with Dλ ⊆ Sλ, for λ ∈ L),
their conjunction
V
λ∈L

D
↑
λ,Sλ

is deﬁned by
V
λ∈L

D
↑
λ,Sλ

:=
T
λ∈L D
↑
λ

,supλ∈L Sλ

.
Note, that since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ exists. If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then we have
T
λ∈L D
↑
λ

=

T
λ∈L

rS
Sλ
−1
(Dλ)
↑
. Again, abusing notation, we write
V
λ∈L D
↑
λ :=
T
λ∈L D
↑
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersection symbol ∩ inter-
changeably).
We deﬁne the relation ⊆ between events (E,S) and (F,S0), by (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0) if and only
if E ⊆ F as sets and S0  S. If E 6= ∅, we have that (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0) if and only if E ⊆ F
as sets. Note however that for E = ∅S we have (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0) if and only if S0  S. Hence
we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0) as long as we keep in mind that in the case
of E = ∅S we have ∅S ⊆ F if and only if S  S(F). It follows from these deﬁnitions that for
events E and F, E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only when E and F have the same base, i.e.,
S(E) = S(F).
The disjunction of
n
D
↑
λ
o
λ∈L
is deﬁned by the de Morgan law
W
λ∈L D
↑
λ = ¬
V
λ∈L ¬

D
↑
λ

.
Typically
W
λ∈L D
↑
λ $
S
λ∈L D
↑
λ, and if all Dλ are nonempty we have that
W
λ∈L D
↑
λ =
S
λ∈L D
↑
λ
holds if and only if all the D
↑
λ have the same base-space. Note, that by these deﬁnitions, the
conjunction and disjunction of (at most countably many measurable) events is a (measurable)
event.
Apart from the measurability conditions, the event-structure outlined so far is analogous
to Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a, 2006b). An example is shown in Figure 1. It depicts a
lattice with four spaces and projections. The event that p obtains is indicated by the dotted
areas, whereas the grey areas illustrate the event that not p obtains.
2.6 Probability Measures
Here and in what follows, we mean by events always measurable events in Σ unless otherwise
stated.
Let ∆(S) be the set of probability measures on (S,FS). We consider this set itself as a
measurable space endowed with the σ-ﬁeld F∆(S) generated by the sets {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(D) ≥ p},
where D ∈ FS and p ∈ [0,1].
6Figure 1: Event Structure
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2.7 Marginals
For a probability measure µ ∈ ∆(S0), the marginal µ|S of µ on S  S0 is deﬁned by
µ|S (D) := µ

rS0
S
−1
(D)

, D ∈ FS.
Let Sµ be the space on which µ is a probability measure. Whenever Sµ  S(E) then we
abuse notation slightly and write
µ(E) = µ(E ∩ Sµ).
If S(E)  Sµ, then we say that µ(E) is undeﬁned.
2.8 Types
I is the nonempty set of individuals. For every individual, each state gives rise to a probabilistic
belief over states in some space.
Deﬁnition 1 For each individual i ∈ I there is a type mapping ti : Ω →
S
α∈A ∆(Sα), which
is measurable in the sense that for every S ∈ S and Q ∈ F∆(S) we have t−1
i (Q) ∩ S ∈ FS, for
all S ∈ S.
We require the type mapping ti to satisfy the following properties:
(0) Conﬁnement: If ω ∈ S0 then ti(ω) ∈ 4(S) for some S  S0.
7(1) If S00  S0  S, ω ∈ S00, and ti(ω) ∈ 4(S) then ti(ωS0) = ti(ω).
(2) If S00  S0  S, ω ∈ S00, and ti(ω) ∈ 4(S0) then ti(ωS) = ti(ω)|S.
(3) If S00  S0  S, ω ∈ S00, and ti(ωS0) ∈ 4(S) then Sti(ω)  S.
ti(ω) represents individual i’s belief at state ω. Properties (0) to (3) guarantee the coherence
of belief and awareness down the lattice structure. Conﬁnement means that at any given state
ω ∈ Ω an individual’s belief is concentrated on states that “are all described with the same
vocabulary - the vocabulary available to the individual at ω. This vocabulary may be less
expressive than the vocabulary used to describe statements in the state ω.”
Properties (1) to (3) compare the types of an individual in a state ω and its projection to ωS.
Property (1) and (2) means that at the projected state ωS the individual believes everything
she believes at ω given that she is aware of it at ωS. Property (3) means that at ω an individual
can not be unaware of an event that she is aware of at the projected state ωS.
Deﬁne6
Beni (ω) :=
n
ω0 ∈ Ω : ti(ω0)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω)
o
.
This is the set of states at which individual i’s type or the marginal thereof coincides with
her type at ω. Such sets are events in our structure:
Remark 1 For any ω ∈ Ω, Beni(ω) is an Sti(ω)-based event.
Note that Beni(ω) may not be measurable.
Assumption 1 If Beni(ω) ⊆ E, for an event E, then ti(ω)(E) = 1.
This assumption implies introspection (Property (v)) in Proposition 7. Note, that if Beni(ω)
is measurable, then Assumption 1 implies ti(ω)(Beni(ω)) = 1.
Deﬁnition 2 We denote by Ω :=

S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I

an interactive unawareness belief
structure.
2.9 Awareness and Unawareness
The deﬁnition of awareness is analogous to the deﬁnition in unawareness knowledge structures
(see Remark 6 in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2006b).
Deﬁnition 3 For i ∈ I and an event E, deﬁne the awareness operator
Ai (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : ti (ω) ∈ ∆(S),S  S (E)}
if there is a state ω such that ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E), and by
Ai(E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
6The name “Ben” is chosen analogously to the “ken” in knowledge structures.
8An individual is aware of an event if and only if his type is concentrated on a space in which
the event is “expressible.”
Proposition 1 If E is an event then Ai(E) is an S (E)-based event.
This proposition shows that the set of states in which an individual is aware of an event is
indeed an event in our structure. Moreover, the operator is convenient to work with since the
event Ai(E) has the same base-space as the event E.
Unawareness is naturally deﬁned as the negation of awareness:
Deﬁnition 4 For i ∈ I and an event E, the unawareness operator is now deﬁned by
Ui(E) = ¬Ai(E).
Note that the deﬁnition of our negation and Proposition 1 imply that if E is an event, then
Ui(E) is an S (E)-based event.
Note further that Deﬁnition 3 and 4 apply also to events that are not necessarily measurable.
An example of unawareness is presented in Example 1, Figure 2. For instance, at state ω2,
Nikolai (intermitted ellipses) is unaware of the event S since his type is concentrated on S0,
where S0  S. Yet, he is aware of the event S0↑.
2.10 Belief
The p-belief-operator is deﬁned as usual (see for instance Monderer and Samet, 1989):
Deﬁnition 5 For i ∈ I, p ∈ [0,1] and an event E, the p-belief operator is deﬁned, as usual, by
B
p
i (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p},
if there is a state ω such that ti(ω)(E) ≥ p, and by
B
p
i (E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
Proposition 2 If E is an event then B
p
i (E) is an S (E)-based event.
This proposition shows that the set of states in which an individual believes an event with
probability at least p is an event in our structure that has the same base-space as the event E.
The p-belief operator has the standard properties stated in Proposition 7 in the appendix.
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) showed that in a standard state-space unawareness
must be trivial, even if the belief operator satisﬁes only very weak properties. In contrast, we
show in Proposition 8 (see appendix) that the strong notion of p-belief (in particular also
probability one belief) allows for all properties of unawareness that have been proposed in the
literature.
9In Proposition 10 in the appendix, we state some multi-person properties of awareness
and belief. For instance, we show that if an individual is aware of an event E, then she can also
conceive of that others are aware of the event E. Moreover, we show that common awareness
and mutual awareness coincide. That is, if everybody is aware of an event, then everybody can
conceive of that everybody is aware of the event, everybody is aware of that, etc.
3 Bayesian Games with Unawareness
In this section, we generalize strategic games with incomplete information a l` a Harsanyi (1967/68)
and Mertens and Zamir (1985, Section 5) to include also unawareness. For simplicity, we con-
sider ﬁrst Bayesian games with unawareness in which every player is aware of all of her and
other’s actions, and all the players. In the appendix we generalize our theory to allow also for
unawareness of actions and players. For notational convenience, we restrict ourselves in this
section to a ﬁnite set of players, ﬁnite sets of actions, ﬁnite state-spaces, and assume that for
each S ∈ S, FS = 2S.
Deﬁnition 6 A Bayesian game with unawareness of events consists of an unawareness belief
structure Ω =

S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I

that is augmented by a tuple


(Mi)i∈I ,(ui)i∈I

deﬁned
as follows: For each player i ∈ I, there is
(i) a ﬁnite nonempty set of actions Mi, and
(ii) a utility function ui :
 Q
i∈I Mi

× Ω −→ R.
The interpretation is as follows: At the beginning of a game, a state ω ∈ Ω is realized.
Player i does not observe the state but receives a signal ti(ω) that provides her with some
information about the state or projections thereof to lower spaces. I.e., if ω obtains, player i is
of type ti(ω). This signal is a belief about the likelihood of events on a certain space. A player’s
utility depends on her action, the actions chosen by other players as well as the state. Since
players may be uncertain about the state ω, we assume below that the player’s preference is
represented by the expected value of the utility function on action-proﬁles of players and states,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the player i’s type ti(ω) and the types’ mixed
strategies. This game allows for unawareness of possibly payoﬀ relevant events.
Let ∆(Mi) be the set of mixed strategies for player i ∈ I, that is, the set of probability
distributions on the ﬁnite set Mi.
Deﬁnition 7 A strategy of player i in a Bayesian game with unawareness of events is a func-
tion σi : Ω −→ ∆(Mi) such that for all ω ∈ Ω,
(i) σi(ω) ∈ ∆(Mi),
(ii) ti(ω) = ti(ω0) implies σi(ω) = σi(ω0).
A strategy speciﬁes for each player and state a probability distribution over her set of her
actions. In standard Bayesian games without unawareness, one interpretation of a strategy
10assumes an ex-ante point of view of the player before she knows her type. This interpretation
is misleading in a game with unawareness, since if a player is aware of all her types ex-ante
she should be also aware of all types interim, i.e., after learning her type (and her awareness).
Hence, in the case of unawareness, the ex-ante notion of strategy is a useful construct for the
game theorist rather than for a player.
In Bayesian games with unawareness we subscribe to a second interpretation of Bayesian
strategy from an interim point of view: Given a player i and type ti(ω), she has an “awareness
level” Sti(ω) ∈ S. That is, she can consider strategies of her opponents in l(Sti(ω)), where
l(S) := {S0 ∈ S : S0  S} is the complete sublattice of S with S being the upmost space. This
interpretation is sound precisely because of Propositions 4 and 5 below: To best-respond to the
strategies of the other player-types, a type of a player needs only to reason about the strategies
of player-types that she is aware of. Only strategies of these player-types enter in her utility
maximization problem.
Denote σSti(ω) :=

(σj(ω0))j∈I

ω0∈Sti(ω)
. A component σj(ω0) of the strategy proﬁle σSti(ω)
is the strategy of the player-type (j,tj(ω0)). σSti(ω) is the proﬁle of all player-types’ strategies.
The expected utility of player-type (i,ti(ω)) from the strategy proﬁle σSti(ω) is given by
U(i,ti(ω))(σSti(ω)) :=
Z
ω0∈Sti(ω)
X
m∈
Q
j∈I Mj
Y
j∈I
σj(ω0)(mj) · ui

(mj)j∈I ,ω0

dti(ω)(ω0). (1)
σj(ω0)(mj) is the probability with which the player-type (j,tj(ω0)) plays the action mj ∈ Mj. Q
j∈I σj(ω0)(mj) is the joint probability with which the action proﬁle m = (mj)j∈I is played by
the players. This action proﬁle gives the utility ui ((mj)j∈I,ω0) to player i in state ω0. The term
P
m∈
Q
j∈I Mj
Q
j∈I σj(ω0)(mj) · ui

(mj)j∈I ,ω0

is player i’s expected utility from the strategy
proﬁle (σj(ω0))j∈I at the state ω0. However, at a state ω, the player, in general, does not know
the state, but only his type ti(ω), and so he evaluates his utility with the expectation with
respect to the probability measure ti(ω).
Deﬁnition 8 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium of a Bayesian game with unawareness of events 
S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game deﬁned by:
(i) {(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I} is the set of players,
and for each player (i,ti(ω)),
(ii) the set of mixed strategies is ∆(Mi), and
(iii) the utility function is given by equation (1).
An equilibrium of a Bayesian game with unawareness is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic
game in which types of players are the “players”. The actions available to the type of player i at
state ω are the actions of player i. The utility function of the type of player i at ω is the expected
utility function, given player i’s awareness and belief over states at ω. In an equilibrium of a
11Bayesian game with unawareness of events, the type of every player chooses an optimal mixture
of actions, given her awareness, belief and the choices of the types of the other players she is
aware of. This is analogous to equilibrium in Bayesian games without unawareness.
Proposition 3 (Existence) Let

S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

be a Bayesian game with
unawareness of events. If I, Ω, and (Mi)i∈I are ﬁnite, then there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. By Nash’s (1950) theorem. 
Note that contrary to an ordinary Bayesian game, the game is not “common knowledge”
among the players. Let

S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

be a Bayesian game with unaware-
ness of events. At ω ∈ Ω, the game conceived by player i is

l(Sti(ω)),

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

,
where the lattice of spaces is replaced with the sublattice l(Sti(ω)) with Sti(ω) as the upmost
space,

rSα
Sβ

are restricted to Sα,Sβ ∈ l(Sti(ω)), and accordingly, the domains of the ti and ui
are restricted to
S
S∈l(Sti(ω)) S. Type ti(ω) of player i can conceive of all events expressible in
the spaces of the sublattice l(Sti(ω)). For S ∈ S, we call

l(S),

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

the S-partial Bayesian game with unawareness of events.
The following proposition shows that we can naturally extend equilibria from “lower aware-
ness levels to higher awareness levels” by taking the equilibrium strategies at the “lower aware-
ness levels” ﬁxed and looking for a ﬁxed point at “higher awareness levels”.
Proposition 4 (“Upwards Induction”) Given a Bayesian game with unawareness of events 
S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

, deﬁne for S0,S00 ∈ S with S0  S00 the S0-partial (resp.
S00-partial) Bayesian game with unawareness of events. If I, Ω, and (Mi)i∈I are ﬁnite, then
for every equilibrium of the S0-partial Bayesian game, there is an equilibrium of the S00-partial
Bayesian game in which equilibrium strategies of player-types in {(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈
S
S∈l(S0) S and i ∈
I} are identical with the equilibrium strategies in the S0-partial Bayesian game.
This proposition suggests a procedure for constructing equilibria in Bayesian games with
unawareness. We start with an equilibrium in the ˆ S-partial Bayesian game with unawareness,
where ˆ S denotes the greatest lower bound space (the meet) of the lattice, and extend it step-
by-step to higher spaces by ﬁnding a ﬁxed-point taking the strategies of player-types in the
respective lower spaces as given.
For some strategic situations, Proposition 4 suggests that players which are unaware may
have commitment power compared to players with a “higher awareness level”. This is so because
types with “lower awareness levels” do not react to types of which they are unaware. Types
with “higher awareness” must take strategies of types with “lower awareness” as given. In some
strategic situations, the value of awareness may be negative.
Proposition 4 may also be interpreted as what happens if players learn, i.e. become aware
of some event. We can consider a player at a certain state ω, and compare her strategy with
the strategy of the same player but at a state in ω’s inverse image in a higher space.
12Proposition 5 Let

S,

rSα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi),(ui)

be a Bayesian game with unawareness
of events. Deﬁne for S0,S00 ∈ S with S0  S00 the S0-partial (resp. S00-partial) Bayesian game
with unawareness of events. Then for every equilibrium of the S00-partial Bayesian game there
is an equilibrium of the S0-partial Bayesian game in which the equilibrium strategies of player-
types in {(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈
S
S∈l(S0) S and i ∈ I} are identical with the equilibrium strategies of
the S00-partial Bayesian game.
This proposition says that we can naturally restrict an equilibrium from higher awareness
levels to lower awareness. This is so, because if player-types play an equilibrium in a game
that allows for “higher awareness levels”, then those player-types still play optimally at “lower
awareness levels given that they exist there”.
We conclude this section with a simple example that touches a prime theme of unawareness:
novelties, inventions and innovations.
Example 1 (The Mathematician’s Dilemma) Two brilliant mathematicians, Emmy and
Nicolai, consider to compete on solving a problem in mathematics. Solving the problem now
rather than later is costly because there are also other unsolved problems they could try to
solve. We assume that the costs of solving it now rather than later are 100K dollars for either
player. Moreover, we assume that a solution to this problem is prized at 180K dollars. This is
to be shared if both solve it at the same time. If only one solves it now, and the other later,
then the latter gets nothing and the former 180K.
When solving the problem, any of the two mathematicians could be quite unexpectedly
aware of a brilliant idea that would not only solve their problem but also prove the Riemann
Hypothesis. This chance-discovery is not foreseen by anybody in the profession. Luckily the
Clay Mathematics Institute of Cambridge, M.A., oﬀers a reward of 1 million dollars for the
proof of the Riemann Hypothesis. We assume that this prize is shared if both provide a proof
at the same time. If one is ﬁrst, then he gets the entire prize.
To model their awareness and beliefs, we consider two state-spaces S and S0. We assume
that S is richer than S0 in the sense that whenever a player believes some state in S, then (s)he
is aware of the brilliant idea. A player’s belief at each state is given by a probability distribution
on one of those spaces. To be precise, consider the information structure in Figure 2. There are
three states, ω1 and ω2 in S and ω3 in S0. The solid (resp. dashed) lines/ovals belong to Emmy
(resp. Nicolai). For instance, the solid line starting in ω1 indicates that at state ω1 Emmy
believes with probability one that ω2 obtained. Since ω2 ∈ S, she is aware of the brilliant idea.
Yet, at ω2, Nicolai believes with probability one that ω3 ∈ S0 obtained, which means that at
ω2, Nicolai is unaware of the brilliant idea. It also means that at ω2, and hence at ω1, Emmy
believes that Nicolai is unaware of the brilliant idea. Note however, that at ω1 Nicolai is aware
of the brilliant idea, he believes that Emmy is aware of it, and he believes that Emmy believes
that he (Nicolai) is unaware of it.
At each state, both mathematicians have two actions: work on it now or later. In Figure 2,
we also depict the payoﬀ matrix whose entries correspond to the story above.
The payoﬀ matrices together with the information structure constitute a Bayesian game
with unawareness. What could be a solution? An equilibrium should specify for each state an
optimal strategy proﬁle given the beliefs and awareness of the players at that state. We start
13Figure 2: Information Structure and Payoﬀs in the Mathematician’s Dilemma
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by considering optimal strategies at ω3 ∈ S0, the space where both players are unaware of the
brilliant idea. In the symmetric game at ω3, (later) is the dominant action for both players.
Next consider the state ω2 ∈ S. At this state, Emmy is aware of the brilliant idea because
she believes ω2 ∈ S with probability one. In contrast, Nicolai is unaware of it because at ω2
he believes in ω3 ∈ S0 with probability one. Note that at ω2 Emmy believes that Nicolai is
unaware of it. Both player’s dominant action is (later).
Finally, consider the state ω1 ∈ S. At this state both Emmy and Nicolai are aware of the
brilliant idea since their “information sets” lie in S. But since Emmy’s “information set” at
ω1 is {ω2} and at ω2 Nicolai’s “information set ” is {ω3} ⊂ S0, Emmy believes that Nicolai is
unaware of it. Moreover, Nicolai believes that Emmy is aware of it, and he believes that Emmy
believes that he (Nicolai) is unaware of it. So for Emmy the dominant action at ω1 is later but
for Nicolai it is now. That is, even though Emmy is aware of the brilliant idea and could solve
the Riemann Hypothesis, she won’t receive the desired award.
Note that the result of the example continues to hold if beliefs are slightly perturbed. E.g.,
at ω1 and ω2 Emmy could assign probability 1
1000 to ω1 and 999
1000 to ω2. 
4 Common Prior, Agreement, and Speculation
In this section, we deﬁne a common prior and show by example that the common prior as-
sumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade under unawareness. With unawareness, we
can have common certainty of willingness to trade but strict preference to trade. Yet, we are
able to prove a “No-Trade” theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of
strict preference to trade under unawareness. Moreover, we prove a “No-Agreeing-to-Disagree”
theorem.
4.1 Common Belief
We deﬁne mutual and common belief as usual (e.g. Monderer and Samet, 1989):
14From now on, we assume that the set of individuals I is at most countable.
Deﬁnition 9 The mutual p-belief operator on events is deﬁned by
Bp(E) =
\
i∈I
B
p
i (E).
The common certainty operator on events is deﬁned by
CB1 (E) =
∞ \
n=1
 
B1n (E).
That is, the mutual p-belief of an event E is the event in which everybody p-believes the
event E. Common certainty of E is the event that everybody is certain of the event E, and
everybody is certain that everybody is certain of the event E, everybody is certain of that, ... ad
inﬁnitum. Common certainty is the generalization of common knowledge to the probabilistic
notion of certainty. Note that Proposition 2 and the deﬁnition of the conjunction of events
imply that Bp(E) and CB1 (E) are S(E)-based events, for any measurable event E.
We say that an event E is common certainty at ω ∈ Ω if ω ∈ CB1 (E).
4.2 Priors and Common Priors
In a standard type space S, a prior PS
i of player i is a convex combination of the beliefs of i’s
types in S (Samet, 1998). That is, for every event E ∈ FS,
PS
i (E) =
Z
S
ti (·)(E)dPS
i (·). (2)
In particular, if S is ﬁnite or countable, this equality holds if and only if
PS
i (E) =
X
s∈S
ti (s)(E)PS
i ({s}). (3)
In words, to ﬁnd the probability PS
i (E) that the prior PS
i assigns to an event E, one should
check the beliefs ti (s)(E) ascribed by player i to the event E in each state s ∈ S, and then
average these beliefs according to the weights PS
i ({s}) assigned by the prior PS
i to the diﬀerent
states s ∈ S.
PS is a common prior on S if PS is a prior for every player i ∈ I.
Here we generalize these deﬁnitions to unawareness structures, as follows.
Deﬁnition 10 (Prior) A prior for player i is a system of probability measures Pi =
 
PS
i

S∈S ∈ Q
S∈S ∆(S) such that
1. The system is projective: If S0  S then the marginal of PS
i on S0 is PS0
i . (That is, if
E ∈ Σ is an event whose base-space S (E) is lower or equal to S0, then PS
i (E) = PS0
i (E).)
2. Each probability measure PS
i is a convex combination of i’s beliefs in S: For every event
E ∈ Σ such that S(E)  S,
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PS
i (E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E)) =
Z
S∩Ai(E)
ti (·)(E)dPS
i (·). (2u)
P =
 
PS
S∈S ∈
Q
S∈S ∆(S) is a common prior if P is a prior for every player i ∈ I.
In particular, if S is ﬁnite or countable, equality (2u) holds if and only if
PS
i (E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E)) =
X
s∈S∩Ai(E)
ti (s)(E)PS
i ({s}). (3u)
What is the reason for the diﬀerence between (2) and (2u) (or similarly between (3)
and (3u))? With unawareness, ti (s)(E) is well deﬁned only for states s ∈ S in which player i is
aware of E, i.e., the states s ∈ S ∩ Ai (E). Hence there is the diﬀerence in the deﬁnition of the
domain of integration (or summation) on the right-hand side. Consequently, E (or equivalently
E ∩ S) on the left-hand side of (2) and (3) is replaced by E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E) in (2u) and (3u).
Figure 3 illustrates a common prior in an unawareness belief structure. Odd (resp. even)
states in the upper space project to the odd (resp. even) state in the lower space. There are
two individuals, one indicated by the solid lines and ellipses and another by intermitted lines
and ellipses. Note that the ratio of probabilities over odd and even states in each “information
cell” coincides with the ratio in the “information cell” in the lower space.
16Figure 4: Information Structure in the Speculative Trade Example
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4.3 Speculation
In this section, we investigate whether the common prior assumption implies the absence of
speculative trade (e.g. Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). The following example shows that specula-
tion is possible under unawareness even if we assume that there is a common prior.
Example 2 (Speculative Trade under Unawareness) Consider the probabilistic version
of the speculative trade example of Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006a). There is an owner, o,
of a ﬁrm and a potential buyer, b, whose awareness diﬀer. The owner is aware that there may
be a costly lawsuit [l] involving the ﬁrm, but he is unaware of a potential novelty [n] enhancing
the value of the ﬁrm. In contrast, the buyer is aware that there might be the innovation, but
he is unaware of the lawsuit. Both are aware that the ﬁrm may face high sales [s] or not in
future.
The information structure is depicted in Figure 4. The solid lines and ellipses belong
the buyer, whereas the intermitted lines and ellipses belong to the seller. At state (nls) the
buyer’s type has full support on space S{ns} whereas the seller’s type has full support on space
S{ls}. Hence the buyer is uncertain whether the innovation obtains or not, and the seller is
uncertain whether the lawsuit obtains. However, the buyer is certain that the seller is unaware
of the innovation because the seller’s type at states in S{ns} has full support on the space S{s}.
Similarly, the seller is certain that the buyer is unaware of the lawsuit.
17Figure 5: Speculative Trade with Delusion
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Suppose that the status quo value of the ﬁrm with high sales is 100 dollars, but only 80
dollars with low sales. If the potential innovation obtains, this would add 20 dollars to the value
of the ﬁrm, whereas the potential lawsuit would cost the ﬁrm 20 dollars. The player’s beliefs
are stated in Figure 4 as well. According to these beliefs at state (nls), the buyer’s expected
value of the ﬁrm is 100, whereas the seller’s expected value of the ﬁrm is 80 dollars. However,
the buyer (resp. seller) is certain that the seller’s (resp. buyer’s) expected value is 90 dollars.
We assume that both players are rational in the sense of maximizing their respective payoﬀ
given their belief and awareness. The buyer (resp. seller) prefers to buy (resp. sell) at price x
if her expected value of the ﬁrm is at least (resp. at most) x. The buyer (resp. seller) strictly
prefers to buy (resp. sell) at price x if her expected value of the ﬁrm is strictly above (resp.
strictly below) x.
Note that the beliefs stated below the states in each space are consistent with a common
prior. However, at state (nls) and at the price 90 dollars, there is common certainty of prefer-
ence to trade, but each player strictly prefers to trade. This is impossible in standard state-space
structures with a common prior. 
Despite this counter example to the “No-trade” theorems, we can prove below a generalized
“No-trade” theorem according to which, if there is a common prior, then there can not be
common certainty of strict preference to trade. That is, even with unawareness not “everything
goes”. We ﬁnd this surprising, because unawareness can be interpreted as a special form of
delusion: At a given state, a player may be certain of states in a very diﬀerent lower state-space.
The following example demonstrates that speculative trade is possible in delusional standard
state-space structures with a common prior.
Example 3 (Speculative Trade with Delusion) Consider the information structure in
Figure 5. The common prior and the information structure allows the dashed player to have a
posterior of tdashed(ω1)({ω1}) = tdashed(ω2)({ω1}) = 1 and the solid player tsolid(ω1)({ω2}) =
tsolid(ω2)({ω2}) = 1. So they may happily disagree on the expected value of a random variable
deﬁned on this standard state-space. 
Deﬁnition 11 A common prior P =
 
PS
S∈S ∈
Q
S∈S ∆(S) is non-degenerate if and only
if for all i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω: If ti (ω) ∈ 4(S0), for some S0, then [ti(ω)] ∩ S0 ∈ FS0 and
18PS

([ti (ω)] ∩ S0)
↑ ∩ S

> 0 for all S  S0.
For every type, a non-degenerate common prior puts positive weight on the set of “station-
ary” states where the player has this type. This condition implies that for each player there
can be at most countably many types in each space.
Deﬁnition 12 Let x1 and x2 be real numbers and v a random variable on Ω. Deﬁne the sets
E
≤x1
1 :=
n
ω ∈ Ω :
R
St1(ω) v (·)d(t1 (ω))(·) ≤ x1
o
and
E
≥x2
2 :=
n
ω ∈ Ω :
R
St2(ω) v (·)d(t2 (ω))(·) ≥ x2
o
. We say that at ω, conditional on his infor-
mation, player 1 (resp. player 2) believes that the expectation of v is weakly below x1 (resp.
weakly above x2) if and only if ω ∈ E
≤x1
1 (resp. ω ∈ E
≥x2
1 ).
Note that the sets E
≤x1
1 or E
≥x2
2 may not be events in our unawareness belief structure,
because v (ω) 6= v (ωS) is allowed, for ω ∈ S0  S. Yet, we can deﬁne p-belief, mutual p-belief
and common certainty for measurable7 subsets of Ω, and show that the properties stated in
Proposition 7 and 9 obtain as well (see Meier and Schipper, 2007).8
Theorem 1 Let Ω be a ﬁnite unawareness belief structure and P =
 
PS
S∈S ∈
Q
S∈S ∆(S) be
a non-degenerate common prior. Then there is no state ˜ ω ∈ Ω such that there are a random
variable v : Ω −→ R and x1,x2 ∈ R, x1 < x2, with the following property: at ˜ ω it is common
certainty that conditional on her information, player 1 believes that the expectation of v is
weakly below x1 and, conditional on his information, player 2 believes that the expectation of v
is weakly above x2.
The theorem says that if there is a non-degenerate common prior, then there can not be
common certainty of strict preference to trade. Together with our example of speculative
trade under unawareness we conclude that a common prior does not rule out speculation under
unawareness but it can never be common certainty that both players expect to strictly gain
from speculation. The theorem implies immediately as a corollary that given a non-degenerate
common prior, arbitrary small transaction fees rule out speculative trade under unawareness.
So, with respect to speculative trade, heterogeneous unawareness with a common prior is
“intermediate” between common awareness with heterogeneous priors on the one hand, and
common awareness with a common prior on the other hand. With heterogeneous priors even
in standard state-spaces, common certainty of strict preference to trade is possible.
In a separate appendix to this paper, Meier and Schipper (2007), we extend the above “No-
trade” theorem to inﬁnite unawareness belief structures. To this end we introduce a topological
unawareness belief structure and consider as a technical device a “ﬂattened” structure with the
union of all spaces in the lattice as the state-space. All properties of p-belief in Proposition 7
and 9 are extended to measurable subsets of Ω.
7A subset E of the union of the state spaces is deﬁned to be measurable if and only if the intersection E ∩ S
is measurable in S, for every state space S.
8Contrary to our deﬁnition of the negation of an event, in point (ii) of Proposition 7, ¬E is here understood
to be the relative complement of E with respect to the union of state spaces.
194.4 Agreement
For an event E and p ∈ [0,1] deﬁne the set [ti(E) = p] := {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) = p}, if
{ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) = p} is nonempty, and otherwise set [ti(E) = p] := ∅S(E).
Lemma 1 [ti(E) = p] is a S(E)-based event.
Proof. [ti(E) = p] = B
p
i (E) ∩ B
1−p
i (¬E). Hence the proof follows from Proposition 2. 
The following proposition is a generalization of the standard “No-Agreeing-to-Disagree”
theorem (Aumann, 1976):
Proposition 6 Let Ω be an unawareness belief structure, G be an event and pi ∈ [0,1], for
i ∈ I. Suppose there exists a common prior P =
 
PS
S∈S ∈
Q
S∈S ∆(S) such that for some
space S  S(G) we have PS(CB1(
T
i∈I[ti(G) = pi])) > 0. Then pi = pj, for all i,j ∈ I.9
The proposition says the following: Suppose individuals have a common prior that is weakly
non-degenerate in the sense that it assigns strict positive probability to the event that posteriors
of G are common certainty. Then common certainty of posteriors for the event G implies that
those posteriors must agree across all individuals. So individuals with a common prior can not
agree-to-disagree on the posteriors of events which they are all aware of.
Note, that a non-degenerate common prior (Deﬁnition 11) implies the condition PS(CB1(
T
i∈I[ti(G) =
pi])) > 0 in Proposition 6 if CB1(
T
i∈I[ti(G) = pi]) is nonempty and S  S(G).
Appendices
A Properties of Belief and Awareness
Proposition 7 Let E and F be events, {El}l=1,2,... be an at most countable collection of events, and
p,q ∈ [0,1]. The following properties of belief obtain:
(o) B
p
i (E) ⊆ B
q
i (E), for q ≤ p,
(i) Necessitation: B1
i (Ω) = Ω,
(ii) Additivity: B
p
i (E) ⊆ ¬B
q
i (¬E), for p + q > 1,
(iiia) B
p
i (
T∞
l=1 El) ⊆
T∞
l=1 B
p
i (El),
(iiib) for any decreasing sequence of events {El}∞
l=1, B
p
i (
T∞
l=1 El) =
T∞
l=1 B
p
i (El),
(iiic) B1
i (
T∞
l=1 El) =
T∞
l=1 B1
i (El),
(iv) Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies B
p
i (E) ⊆ B
p
i (F),
(v) Introspection: B
p
i (E) ⊆ B1
i B
p
i (E).
9In the appendix, we prove a more general version in which we require only a “local” common prior on a
space S  S(G) satisfying the condition stated in the proposition.
20In our unawareness belief structure, Necessitation means that an individual always is certain of the
universal event Ω, i.e. she is certain of “tautologies with the lowest expressive power.” (ii) means that if
an individual believes an event E with at least probability p, then she can not believe the negation of E
with any probability strictly greater than 1 − p. Property (iii a - c) are variations of conjunction, i.e., if
an individual believes a conjunction of events with probability at least p, then she p-believes each of the
events. The interpretation of monotonicity is: If an event E implies an event F, then p-believing the
event E implies that the individual also p-believes the event F. Property (v) concerns the introspection
of belief: If an individual believes the event E with at least probability p then she is certain that she
believes the event E with at least probability p.
Proposition 8 Let E be an event and p,q ∈ [0,1]. The following properties of awareness and belief
obtain:
1. Plausibility: Ui(E) ⊆ ¬B
p
i (E) ∩ ¬B
p
i ¬B
p
i (E),
2. Strong Plausibility: Ui(E) ⊆
T∞
n=1 (¬B
p
i )
n (E),
3. BpU Introspection: B
p
i Ui(E) = ∅S(E) for p ∈ (0,1]
B0
i Ui(E) = Ai(E)
,
4. AU Introspection: Ui(E) = UiUi(E),
5. Weak Necessitation: Ai(E) = B1
i
 
S(E)↑
,
6.
B
p
i (E) ⊆ Ai(E)
B0
i (E) = Ai(E) ,
7. B
p
i (E) ⊆ AiB
q
i (E),
8. Symmetry: Ai(E) = Ai(¬E),
9. A Conjunction:
T
λ∈L Ai (Eλ) = Ai
 T
λ∈L Eλ

,
10. ABp Self Reﬂection: AiB
p
i (E) = Ai(E),
11. AA Self Reﬂection: AiAi(E) = Ai(E),
12. B
p
i Ai(E) = Ai(E).
These properties are analogous to the properties in unawareness knowledge structures (Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper, 2006a, 2006b). In the context of knowledge, Properties 1 to 5 have been suggested by
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998), and 8 to 11 by Fagin and Halpern (1988), Modica and Rustichini
(1999) and Halpern (2001).
Note that properties 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12 hold also for non-measurable events, because even if E
is not measurable, by 5. Ai(E) is measurable.
Property 6 implies that probability zero belief is distinct from unawareness. In fact, an individual
is aware of an event if and only if she assigns at least probability zero to this event.
Although we model awareness of events, Property 8 suggests that we model a notion of awareness
of issues or questions. Let an issue or question (E.g., is the stock market crashing?) be such that it can
be answered with in the aﬃrmative (The stock market is crashing.) or the negative (The stock market
is not crashing.). By symmetry (Property 8), an individual is aware of an event if and only if she is
aware of the its negation. Thus we model the awareness of questions and issues rather than just single
events. In fact, by weak necessitation, Property 5, an individual is aware of an event E if and only if
she is aware of any event that can be “expressed” in a space with the same “expressive power” as the
base-space of E.
21Deﬁnition 13 An event E is evident if for each i ∈ I, E ⊆ B1
i (E).
Proposition 9 For every event F ∈ Σ:
(i) CB1(F) is evident, that is CB1(F) ⊆ B1
i (CB1(F)) for all i ∈ I.
(ii) There exists an evident event E such that ω ∈ E and E ⊆ B1
i (F) for all i ∈ I, if and only if
ω ∈ CB1(F).
The proof is analogous to Proposition 3 in Monderer and Samet (1989) for a standard state-space
and thus omitted.
Analogously to mutual belief and common belief, we deﬁne mutual awareness and common awareness:
Deﬁnition 14 The mutual awareness operator on events is deﬁned by
A(E) =
\
i∈I
Ai(E),
and the common awareness operator on events is deﬁned by
CA(E) =
∞ \
n=1
(A)
n (E).
Mutual awareness of an event E is the event that everybody is aware of E. Common awareness of
an event E is the event that everybody is aware of E, everybody is aware that everybody is aware of E,
everybody is aware of that ... ad inﬁnitum.
Proposition 10 Let E be an event and p,q ∈ [0,1]. The following multi-person properties obtain:
1. Ai(E) = AiAj(E),
2. Ai(E) = AiB
p
j(E),
3. B
p
i (E) ⊆ AiB
q
j(E),
4. B
p
i (E) ⊆ AiAj(E),
5. CA(E) = A(E),
6. CB1(E) ⊆ CA(E),
7.
Bp(E) ⊆ A(E),
B0(E) = A(E),
8.
Bp(E) ⊆ CA(E),
B0(E) = CA(E),
9. A(E) = B1(S(E)↑),
10. CA(E) = B1(S(E)↑),
11. CB1(S(E)↑) ⊆ A(E),
12. CB1(S(E)↑) ⊆ CA(E).
Note that properties 1, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 12 also hold for non-measurable events.
22B Generalized Bayesian Games with Unawareness
B.1 Allowing for Unawareness of Actions
Bayesian games with unawareness of events in Deﬁnition 6 do not allow us to model properly unawareness
of actions. In standard Bayesian game theory, ignorance of actions is modelled by the assumption that
players will never use such actions, because payoﬀs are extremely low (i.e. highly negative) (see the
discussion in Harsanyi, 1967, p. 168). We do not follow this convention here. Even in standard Bayesian
games this convention is questionable, because it applies only to rational players. If there is lack of
common belief of rationality then a player’s type being ignorant of an action is indeed diﬀerent from her
obtaining a very low payoﬀ from playing this action (see Hu and Stuart, 2001, for a discussion). In this
subsection we introduce unawareness of actions and discuss the notion of strategy in Bayesian games
with unawareness.
Deﬁnition 15 A Bayesian game with unawareness of events and actions consists of a unawareness belief
structure

S,

r
Sα
Sβ

SβSα
,(ti)i∈I

that is augmented by a tuple


(Mi)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(ui)i∈I

deﬁned as
follows: For each player i ∈ I, there is
(i) a ﬁnite nonempty set of actions Mi and a correspondence Mi : Ω −→ 2Mi \{∅} such that for any
M0
i ⊆ Mi, [M0
i] := {ω ∈ Ω : M0
i ⊆ Mi(ω)} is an event (in the sense of the unawareness belief
structure), and ω0,ω00 ∈ [ti(ω)] ∩ Sti(ω) implies Mi(ω0) = Mi(ω00), for all ω ∈ Ω,
(ii) a utility function ui :
S
ω∈Ω
 Q
i∈I Mi(ω)

× {ω} −→ R.
This deﬁnition allows for unawareness of events as well as actions. Which actions a player i has
available at what state is described explicitly by the correspondence Mi. Any set of available actions
is associated with an event in our unawareness belief structure. We require that, for each type of each
player, the sets of available actions are identical across states in the space on which this type is deﬁned
and at which the player’s type coincides with this type. Note, that if ω / ∈ Sti(ω), then it is allowed that
Mi(ω0) is a proper subset of Mi(ω), for ω0 ∈ [ti(ω)] ∩ Sti(ω). This allows in addition to unawareness
of other players’ actions also for unawareness of own actions. Note, that we exclude that at a state, a
player considers it possible that she has an action available, which, in fact, is not available to her in this
state. This is to avoid the following conceptional problem: What should happen if a player is to take an
action that is not available to her?
B.2 Allowing for Unawareness of Players
So far, we did not allow for unawareness of players. In standard Bayesian game theory, ignorance of
players is modelled by dummy players, i.e., players that obtain a very low payoﬀ for all actions except
one (dummy) action. This is distinct from being unable to conceive of a player at all. In this subsection
we allow for unawareness of players. This requires that we generalize our interactive unawareness belief
structure such that a player may exists only at some states but not at others.
Deﬁnition 16 A Bayesian game with unawareness is a tuple
Γ(Ω) :=

S,

r
Sα
Sβ

SβSα
,E,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(ui)i∈I

deﬁned as follows:
(0) S = {Sα}α∈A is as before a complete lattice of spaces with surjective projections (r
Sα
Sβ), for Sβ  Sα
(see section 2).
23(i) E : I −→ Σ is the “existence” correspondence that assigns to each player i ∈ I an event in which
she exists.
For each player i ∈ I:
(ii) ti : E(i) −→
S
S∈Si ∆(S) is a type mapping that satisﬁes Properties (0) to (3) (see section 2) such
that for every ω ∈ E(i), ti(ω)(E(i)) = 1. Si := {S ∈ S : E(i) ∩ S 6= ∅} is the complete sublattice of
spaces with states in which player i exists.
(iii) Mi is a ﬁnite nonempty set of actions and Mi : E(i) −→ 2Mi \ {∅} is a correspondence such that
for any M0
i ⊆ Mi, [M0
i] := {ω ∈ E(i) : M0
i ⊆ Mi(ω)} is an event (in the sense of the unawareness
belief structure), and ω0,ω00 ∈ Sti(ω) ∩ [ti(ω)] implies Mi(ω0) = Mi(ω00), for all ω ∈ E(i),
(vi) ui :
S
ω∈E(i)
Q
i∈I(ω) Mi(ω)

× {ω} −→ R is a utility function, where I(ω) := {i ∈ I : ω ∈ E(i)}.
This game allows for unawareness of events, actions and players. For every player i ∈ I, the
“existence” correspondence E assigns to i the event in which she exists. Consequently we restrict player
i’s type mapping to states at which she exists. Moreover, player i’s type is concentrated only on states
in which she exists. A player can not assign strict positive probability to states at which she does not
exist. The domain of the correspondence Mi, that assigns to states a non-empty set of actions for player
i, is also restricted to the set of states in which player i exists. We do not allow a player to have some
actions in states in which she does not exist. The dimension of the domain of a utility function may vary
from state to state, since players may exists in some states but not in others, and each players utility at
a state depends on the actions of all the players that exist in that state.
Note that if E(i) = Ω for all i ∈ I, then we obtain a unawareness belief structure and a Bayesian
game with unawareness of events and actions as deﬁned before.
Note further that if ω ∈ E(i), then [ti(ω)] := {ω0 ∈ Ω : ti(ω0) = ti(ω)} ⊆ E(i).
B.3 Equilibrium
By allowing also for unawareness of actions and players, we need to adapt slightly the deﬁnition of a
strategy:
Deﬁnition 17 A strategy of player i is a function σi : E(i) −→ ∆(Mi) such that for all ω ∈ E(i),
(i) σi(ω) ∈ ∆(Mi(ωSti(ω))), and
(ii) ti(ω0) = ti(ω) implies σi(ω0) = σi(ω).
Denote σSti(ω) :=

(σj(ω0))j∈I(ω0)

ω0∈Sti(ω)
. The expected utility of player-type (i,ti(ω)) from the
strategy proﬁle σSti(ω) is given by
U(i,ti(ω))(σSti(ω)) :=
Z
ω0∈Sti(ω)
X
m∈
Q
j∈I(ω0) Mj(ω0
Stj(ω0)
)
Y
j∈I(ω0)
σj(ω0)(mj) · ui

(mj)j∈I(ω0) ,ω0

dti(ω)(ω0).
(4)
Deﬁnition 18 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium of a Bayesian game with unawareness Γ(Ω) is a Nash
equilibrium of the strategic game deﬁned by:
(i) {(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I(ω)} is the set of players,
24and for each player (i,ti(ω)),
(ii) the set of mixed strategies is ∆(Mi(ωSti(ω))), and
(iii) the utility function is given by equation (4 ).
Proposition 3 generalizes to Bayesian games with unawareness. If I, Ω, and (Mi)i∈I are ﬁnite, then,
by Nash’s Theorem, there exists an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 19 Given a Bayesian game with unawareness
Γ(Ω) =

S,

r
Sα
Sβ

SβSα
,E,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(ui)i∈I

we can deﬁne an S0-partial Bayesian
game with unawareness
Γ(Ω
0) =

l(S0),

r
Sα
Sβ

SβSα
,E0,(ti)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(Mi)i∈I ,(ui)i∈I

in which

r
Sα
Sβ

are restricted to
Sα,Sβ ∈ l(S0), E0(i) = E(i) ∩ Ω0, where Ω0 =
S
S∈l(S0) S, and for any i ∈ I the domain of Mi is
restricted to E0(i).
Propositions 4 and 5 generalize to Bayesian games with unawareness. In fact, the proofs in the
appendix are stated for this more general setting.
Example 4 (Feinberg, 2005) The following interesting game due to Feinberg (2005) is an example
of unawareness of actions. It allows us also to compare our unawareness belief structures with the work
by Feinberg (2005). Consider the strategic 3x3 game
Burkhard
b1 b2 b3
a1 (0,2) (3,3) (0,2)
Amanda a2 (2,2) (2,1) (2,1)
a3 (1,0) (4,0) (0,1)
This game has a unique dominance solvable Nash equilibrium, (a2,b1). Consider now a game with
unawareness: The set of players remains unchanged, Amanda, A, and Burkhard, B. There are two
state-spaces, S and S0 with S  S0. In particular, S = {ω1,ω2} and S0 = {ω3}. The information
structure is given by the type mappings
tA(ω1)({w2}) = tA(ω2)({w2}) = tA(ω3)({ω3}) = 1,
tB(ω1)({ω1}) = tB(ω2)({ω3}) = tB(ω3)({ω3}) = 1.
Actions are speciﬁed by
MA(ω1) = MA(ω2) = {a1,a2,a3},MA(ω3) = {a1,a2},
MB(ω1) = MB(ω2) = MB(ω3) = {b1,b2,b3}.
The information structure is the same as in the Mathematician’s Dilemma (with Emmy being now
Amanda and Nicolai being now Burkhard) in Figure 2. At states ω1 and ω2, payoﬀs are given by the
above payoﬀ matrix. At state ω3, payoﬀs are given by the sub-matrix spanned by rows a1 and a2 and
columns b1,b2, and b3 in the above matrix, i.e.,
Burkhard
b1 b2 b3
Amanda a1 (0,2) (3,3) (0,2)
a2 (2,2) (2,1) (2,1)
25We claim that
(σA(ω),σB(ω)) =



(a3,b3) if ω = ω1
(a3,b2) if ω = ω2
(a1,b2) if ω = ω3
is an equilibrium. To see this, note that the game at ω3 has two pure equilibria, (a2,b1) and (a1,b2)
in the S0-partial game, where the latter is payoﬀ dominant. At ω3, both players are unaware of action
a3 in ω3. The unique dominance solvable Nash equilibrium (a2,b1) of the original game (without un-
awareness of actions) remains an equilibrium because none of the players is unaware of an equilibrium
action and equilibrium actions remain best responses if some other actions are deleted. Moreover, after
deleting action a3 (the action both players are unaware of at state ω3 in S0), the game has another Nash
equilibrium (a1,b2). At ω1, both players are aware of all actions but Amanda believes that Burkhard is
unaware of action a3. Hence Amanda believes that Burkhard thinks that (a1,b2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Amanda’s best response to Burkhard playing b2 is a3. Moreover, since at ω1 Burkhard is aware of all
actions and he believes that Amanda believes that Burkhard is unaware of action a3, his best response
to Amanda playing a3 is b3. Note that in this equilibrium at ω1, both receive a low payoﬀ (compared to
the Nash equilibria discussed previously).
Feinberg (2005) obtains (a3,b3) as an equilibrium if both players are aware of all actions, Amanda is
‘unaware’ that Burkhard is aware of all of her actions, and Burkhard is ‘aware’ that Amanda is ‘aware’
of Burkhard being unaware of a3.10 That is, in Feinberg (2005) a player can be aware of an event but
unaware that somebody else is aware of it. This is in contrast to our unawareness belief structure, where
according to Proposition 10, 1., a player is aware of an event if and only if she is aware that somebody
else could be aware of it. That is, if a player can reason about some issue then she can also reason
that somebody else can reason about that issue. We obtain (a3,b3) as an equilibrium if both players
are aware of all actions, Amanda does not believe that Burkhard is aware of a3, Burkhard believes that
Amanda believes that Burkhard is unaware of a3. The example suggests, that higher order ‘awareness’
in Feinberg (2005) operates like belief in our unawareness belief structure. Note however, that Feinberg
(2005) does not deﬁne a notion of belief in his framework. 
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Ai(E) is an S(E)-based event if there exists a subset D ⊆ S(E) s.t. D↑ = Ai(E).
Assume that Ai(E) is non-empty. Deﬁne D := {ω ∈ S(E) : ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S(E))}. By deﬁnition of the
awareness operator, D = Ai(E) ∩ S(E). We show that D↑ = Ai(E).
Let ω ∈ D↑, that is ω ∈ S0 for some S0  S(E) and ωS(E) ∈ D. This is equivalent to ti(ωS(E)) ∈
∆(S(E)). By 0. follows S0  Sti(ω). By 3. we have Sti(ω)  S(E). Thus ω ∈ Ai(E). (Note that
Ai(E) = {ω ∈ Ω : Sti(ω)  S(E)}.)
In the reverse direction, let ω ∈ Ai(E), i.e., ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E). By 0., ω ∈ S0 with S0  S.
Consider ωS(E). By 2., ti(ωS(E)) = ti(ω)|S(E). Hence ωS(E) ∈ D. Thus ω ∈ D↑.
Finally, if Ai(E) is empty, then by deﬁnition of the awareness operator, we have Ai(E) = ∅S(E). 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
B
p
i (E) is an S(E)-based event if there exists a subset D ⊆ S(E) s.t. D↑ = B
p
i (E). Assume that
B
p
i (E) is non-empty. Deﬁne D := {ω ∈ S(E) : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p}. By deﬁnition of the p-belief operator,
10When writing ‘...’, we indicate that those notions diﬀer from our notions used in this paper.
26D = B
p
i (E) ∩ S(E). We show that D↑ = B
p
i (E).
Let ω ∈ D↑, that is ω ∈ S0 for some S0  S(E) and ωS(E) ∈ D. This is equivalent to ti(ωS(E))(E) ≥ p.
By 0. Sti(ωS(E)) = S(E). By 3. we have Sti(ω)  S(E). By 2. it follows that p ≤ ti(ωS(E))(E) =
ti(ω)|S(E)(E). Hence ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. Thus ω ∈ B
p
i (E).
In the reverse direction, let ω ∈ B
p
i (E), i.e., ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. Since ti(ω)(E) ≥ p it follows that
Sti(ω)  S(E). Let ω ∈ S0. By 0. S0  Sti(ω). Consider ωS(E). By 2., ti(ωS(E))(E) = ti(ω)(E)|S(E) ≥ p.
Hence ωS(E) ∈ D. Thus ω ∈ D↑.
Finally, if B
p
i (E) is empty, then by deﬁnition of the p-belief operator, we have B
p
i (E) = ∅S(E). 
C.3 Proof of Remark 1
Deﬁne D := {ω0 ∈ Sti(ω) : ti(ω0) = ti(ω)}. I.e., D = Beni(ω) ∩ Sti(ω). We need to show that
D↑ = Beni(ω).
Consider ﬁrst “⊆”: If ω0 ∈ D↑ then ω0
Sti(ω) ∈ Beni(ω). This is equivalent to ti(ω0
Sti(ω)) = ti(ω) ∈
4(Sti(ω)). By (3) we have Sti(ω0)  Sti(ω). By (2), ti(ω0
Sti(ω)) = ti(ω0)|Sti(ω). It follows that ti(ω0)|Sti(ω) =
ti(ω). Thus ω0 ∈ Beni(ω).
“⊇”: ω0 ∈ Beni(ω) if and only if ti(ω0)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω). Hence for ω0 ∈ Beni(ω), we have Sti(ω0) 
Sti(ω). By (2) ti(ω0
Sti(ω)) = ti(ω0)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω). Hence ω0
Sti(ω) ∈ D. Thus ω0 ∈ D↑. 
C.4 Proof of Proposition 7
(0) B
p
i (E) ⊆ B
q
i (E) for p,q ∈ [0,1] with q ≤ p is trivial.
(i) B1
i (Ω) ⊆ Ω holds trivially. In the reverse direction, note that ti(ω)(Ω) = ti(ω)(Ω ∩ Sti(ω)) =
ti(ω)(Sti(ω)) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus Ω ⊆ B1
i (Ω).
(ii) ω ∈ B
p
i (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. Since ti(ω) is an additive probability measure,
ti(ω)(¬E) ≤ 1 − p. Hence ω ∈ ¬B
q
i (¬E) for q > 1 − p.
(iiia) ω ∈ B
p
i (
T∞
l=1 El) if and only if ti(ω)(
T∞
l=1 El) ≥ p. Monotonicity of the probability measure
ti(ω) implies ti(ω)(El) ≥ p for all l = 1,2,..., which is equivalent to ω ∈
T∞
l=1 B
p
i (El).
(iiib) It is enough to show that any sequence of events {El}∞
l=1 with El ⊇ El+1 for l = 1,2,... we
have B
p
i (
T∞
l=1 El) ⊇
T∞
l=1 B
p
i (El). ω ∈
T∞
l=1 B
p
i (El) if and only if ti(ω)(El) ≥ p for l = 1,2,.... Since
ti(ω) is a countable additive probability measure, it is continuous from above. That is, if El ⊇ El+1 for
l = 1,2,..., we have liml→∞ ti(ω)(El) = ti(ω)(
T∞
l=1 El). Since for every l = 1,2,..., ti(ω)(El) ≥ p, we
have p ≤ liml→∞ ti(ω)(El) = ti(ω)(
T∞
l=1 El). Hence ω ∈ B
p
i (
T∞
l=1 El).
(iiic) It is enough to show that B1
i (
T∞
l=1 El) ⊇
T∞
l=1 B1
i (El). ω ∈
T∞
l=1 B1
i (El) if and only if
ti(ω)(El) = 1 for l = 1,2,.... Since ti(ω) is a countable additive probability measure, it satisﬁes Bonfer-
roni’s Inequality. I.e., ti(ω)(
T∞
l=1 El) ≥ 1 −
P∞
l=1 1 − ti(ω)(El). Since ti(ω)(El) = 1 for all l = 1,2,...,
we have 1 − ti(ω)(El) = 0 for all l = 1,2,..., and hence
P∞
l=1 1 − ti(ω)(El) = 0. It follows that
ti(ω)(
T∞
l=1 El) = 1. We conclude that ω ∈ B1
i (
T∞
l=1 El).
(iv) Since ti(ω) is a probability measure (satisfying monotonicity) for any ω ∈ Ω, E ⊆ F implies
that if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p then ti(ω)(F) ≥ p.
(v) Let ω ∈ B
p
i (E). Then ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. It follows that for all ω0 ∈ Beni(ω) we have ti(ω0)(E) ≥ p.
Hence Beni(ω) ⊆ B
p
i (E). Thus ti(ω)(B
p
i (E)) = 1, which implies that ω ∈ B1
i B
p
i (E). 
27C.5 Proof of Proposition 8
1. This is property is equivalent to B
p
i (E) ∪ B
p
i ¬B
p
i (E) ⊆ Ai(E). By Property 5. we have B
p
i (E) ⊆
Ai(E). To see that B
p
i ¬B
p
i (E) ⊆ Ai(E), note that ω ∈ B
p
i ¬B
p
i (E) if and only if ti(ω)(¬B
p
i (E)) ≥ p. This
implies that Sti(ω)  S(¬B
p
i (E)) = S(E). The last equality follows by Property 8 and Proposition 2.
Hence ω ∈ Ai(E).
2. The proof is analogous to 1. The is property is equivalent to
T∞
n=1 B
p
i (¬B
p
i )
n−1 (E) ⊆ Ai(E).
ω ∈ B
p
i (¬B
p
i )
n−1 (E) for any n = 1,2,... if and only it ti(ω)

(¬B
p
i )
n−1 (E)

≥ p for any n = 1,2,....
It follows that Sti(ω)  S

(¬B
p
i )
n−1 (E)

for any n = 1,2,.... By Proposition 2, S

(¬B
p
i )
n−1 (E)

=
S(E) for any n = 1,2,.... Hence ω ∈ Ai(E).
3. First, we show B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ Ai(E). ω ∈ B
p
i Ui(E) if and only if ti(ω)(Ui(E)) ≥ p. It implies
Sti(ω)  S(Ui(E)). By Proposition 1 S(Ui(E)) = S(E). Hence Sti(ω)  S(E) which is equivalent to
ω ∈ Ai(E).
Second, we show that B
p
i Ui(E) = ∅S(E) for p ∈ (0,1]. Since B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ Ai(E) we have by monotonic-
ity B1
i B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ B1
i Ai(E). By introspection B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ B1
i B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ B1
i Ai(E). By additivity, we
have B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ ¬B1
i Ai(E). Hence B
p
i Ui(E) = ∅S(E) = ¬B1
i Ai(E) ∩ B1
i Ai(E).
Third, we show that B0
i Ui(E) = Ai(E). ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiUi(E) since by AA-
self-reﬂection Ai(E) = AiAi(E) and by symmetry AiAi(E) = AiUi(E). Hence, if ω ∈ Ai(E) then
ti(ω)(Ui(E)) is deﬁned. Therefore ω ∈ B0
i U8E), and hence Ai(E) ⊆ B0
i Ui(E). Together with the ﬁrst
part of the proof, we conclude B0
i Ui(E) = Ai(E).
4. This is property is equivalent to AiUi(E) = Ai(E). ω ∈ AiUi(E) if and only if Sti(ω)  S(Ui(E)) =
S(Ai(E)) = S(E) by Proposition 1. Hence ω ∈ AiUi(E) if and only if ω ∈ Ai(E).
5. ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if Sti(ω)  S(E). For any ti(ω), we have Sti(ω)  S(E) if and only if
1 = ti(ω)(S(E)↑). This is equivalent to ω ∈ B1
i (S(E)↑).
6. First, we show B
p
i (E) ⊆ Ai(E). ω ∈ B
p
i (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. This implies that
Sti(ω)  S(E), which is equivalent to ω ∈ Ai(E).
Second, we show for p = 0, Ai(E) ⊆ B0
i (E). ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E).
Hence ti(ω)(E) ≥ 0, which implies that ω ∈ B0
i (E).
7. ω ∈ B
p
i (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. This implies that Sti(ω)  S(E). By Proposition 2 it is
equivalent to Sti(ω)  S(B
q
i (E)), which is equivalent to ω ∈ AiB
q
i (E).
8. By the deﬁnition of negation, S(E) = S(¬E). Hence for ti(ω) ∈ 4(S), S  S(E) if and only if
S  S(¬E).
9. ω ∈
T
λ∈L Ai(Eλ) if and only if Sti(ω)  S(Eλ) for all λ ∈ L. This is equivalent to Sti(ω) 
supλ∈L S(Eλ) = S
 T
λ∈L Eλ

, which is equivalent to ω ∈ Ai
 T
λ∈L Eλ

.
10. By Proposition 2, S(E) = S(B
p
i (E)). Hence, ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiB
p
i (E).
11. By Proposition 1, S(E) = S(Ai(E)). Hence ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiAi(E).
12. ω ∈ B
p
i Ai(E) if and only if ti(ω)(Ai(E)) ≥ p. This implies Sti(ω)  S(Ai(E)). By Proposition
1, S(Ai(E)) = S(E). Thus ω ∈ Ai(E). To see the converse, by weak necessitation and introspection,
Ai(E) = B1
i (S(E)↑) ⊆ B1
i B1
i (S(E)↑) = B1
i Ai(E). By Proposition 7 (o), B1
i Ai(E) ⊆ B
p
i Ai(E). 
C.6 Proof of Proposition 10
1. By Proposition 1, S(E) = S(Aj(E)). Hence ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiAj(E).
2. By Proposition 2, S(E) = S(B
p
j(E)). Hence, ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiB
p
j(E).
3. ω ∈ B
p
i (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. This implies that Sti(ω)  S(E). By Proposition 2, this
28is equivalent to Sti(ω)  S(B
q
j(E)), which is equivalent to ω ∈ AiB
q
j(E).
4. The proof is analogous to 3.
5. We show by induction that An(E) = A(E), for all n ≥ 1. We have ω ∈ A(An(E)) if and only if
Sti(ω)  S(An(E)), for all i ∈ I, which, by the induction hypothesis, is the case if and only if Sti(ω) 
S(A(E)), for all i ∈ I. By the deﬁnition of “∩”, it is the case that S(A(E)) = supi∈IS(Ai(E)). By
Proposition 1 we have S(Ai(E)) = S(E) and hence S(A(E)) = S(E). It follows that Sti(ω)  S(A(E))
if and only if Sti(ω)  S(E). But Sti(ω)  S(E) if and only if ω ∈ Ai(E). Hence we have An(E) = A(E),
for all n ≥ 1, and therefore CA(E) = A(E).
6. ω ∈ CB1(E) implies ω ∈ B1
i (E) for all i ∈ I. This is equivalent to ti(ω)(E) = 1 for all i ∈ I,
which implies Sti(ω)  S(E) for all i ∈ I. Hence, by 5. we have ω ∈ A(E) = CA(E).
7. First, we show that Bp(E) ⊆ A(E). ω ∈ Bp(E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p for all i ∈ I. Hence
ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E), for all i ∈ I. This implies that ω ∈ Ai(E), for all i ∈ I. It follows that
ω ∈ A(E).
Second, we show that A(E) = B0(E). ω ∈ A(E) if and only if ω ∈ Ai(E) for all i ∈ I if and only if
(by 6. of Proposition 8) ω ∈ B0
i (E) for all i ∈ I if and only if ω ∈ B0(E).
8. The proof follows from 7. and 5.
9. By weak necessitation, A(E) :=
T
i∈I Ai(E) =
T
i∈I B1
i (S(E)↑) := B1(S(E)↑).
10. The proof follows from 9. and 5.
11. By deﬁnition of common certainty, CB1(S(E)↑) ⊆ B1(S(E)↑). By 9., B1(S(E)↑) = A(E).
12. The proof follows from 11. and 5. 
C.7 Proof of Proposition 4
We state the proof for Bayesian games with unawareness (allowing also for unawareness of actions and
players).
Let σ∗
|Ω0 be an equilibrium in the S0-partial Bayesian game with unawareness Γ(Ω
0). For S00  S0 we
deﬁne a strategic form game with
• I(Ω00 \Ω0) := {(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω00,i ∈ I(ω)}\{(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω0,i ∈ I(ω)} being the set of players,
• the set of strategies of player (i,ti(ω)) ∈ I(Ω00,Ω0) is ∆(Mi(ω)),
• the payoﬀ function of player (i,ti(ω)) is given by equation (1) but ﬁxing the strategy of each
(dummy) player in {(i,ti(ω0)) : ω0 ∈ Ω0,i ∈ I(ω0)} to her respective equilibrium strategy σ∗
i (ω) of
the S0-partial Bayesian game with unawareness Γ(Ω
0).
Since I, Ω, and (Mi)i∈I are ﬁnite, this strategic game has an equilibrium by Nash’s (1950) theorem.
Consider now the strategy proﬁle σ∗
|Ω00 in which players in {(i,ti(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω0,i ∈ I(ω)} play their
component of the proﬁle σ∗
|Ω0 and players in I(Ω00 \Ω0) play the equilibrium strategies of the equilibrium
in above deﬁned strategic game.
We need to show that σ∗
|Ω00 is an equilibrium of the S00-partial Bayesian game with unawareness
Γ(Ω
00). Suppose not, then for some player (i,ti(ω)) ∈ I(Ω00) = {(i,ti(ω0)) : ω0 ∈ Ω00,i ∈ I(ω0)} there
exists σi(ω) ∈ ∆(Mi(ω)) with σi(ω) 6= σ∗
i (ω) such that for σSti(ω) :=

σi(ω),(σ∗
j(ω0))ω0∈Sti(ω),j∈I(ω)\{i}

we have
U(i,ti(ω))(σSti(ω)) > U(i,ti(ω))(σ∗
Sti(ω)),
i.e., there exists a proﬁtable deviation from σ∗
|Ω00 for some player-type (i,ti(ω)) with ω ∈ Ω00 and i ∈ I(ω)
given that all other player-types in I(Ω00) play their equilibrium strategy.
29If (i,ti(ω)) ∈ I(Ω00 \ Ω0) then her strategy is not an equilibrium strategy in above deﬁned strategic
game, a contradiction. If (i,ti(ω)) ∈ {(i,ti(ω)) : ω0 ∈ Ω0,i ∈ I(ω0)}, then since her payoﬀs are identical
in both games, her strategy is not an equilibrium strategy in the S0-partial Bayesian game with un-
awareness Γ(Ω0), a contradiction. Hence σ∗
|Ω00 must be an equilibrium of the S00-partial Bayesian game
with unawareness Γ(Ω
00). 
C.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We state the proof for Bayesian games with unawareness (allowing also for unawareness of actions and
players).
Let σ∗
|Ω00 be an equilibrium of the S00-partial Bayesian game with unawareness Γ(Ω
00). Moreover, let
σ∗
|Ω0 be a proﬁle of strategies that is identical with σ∗
|Ω00 for all (i,ti(ω)) ∈ I(Ω0).
Suppose to the contrary that σ∗
|Ω0 is not an equilibrium of the S0-partial Bayesian game with unaware-
ness Γ(Ω
0). Then for some player (i,ti(ω)) ∈ I(Ω0) there exists σi(ω) ∈ ∆(Mi(ω)) with σi(ω) 6= σ∗
i (ω)
such that for σSti(ω) :=

σi(ω),(σ∗
j(ω0))ω0∈Sti(ω),j∈I(ω)\{i}

we have
U(i,ti(ω))(σSti(ω)) > U(i,ti(ω))(σ∗
Sti(ω)),
i.e., there exists a proﬁtable deviation from σ∗
|Ω0 for some player-type (i,ti(ω)) with ω ∈ Ω0 and i ∈ I(ω).
This is a contradiction to σ∗
i (ω) being an equilibrium strategy in the S00-partial Bayesian game with
unawareness Γ(Ω00), because ﬁxing the strategies of the other players, the payoﬀs to this player are the
same in both games. 
C.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Before we prove the proposition, we require following auxiliary results:
Remark 2 For any ω ∈ Ω, ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E)) = ti(ω)(E) for any event E s.t. S(E)  Sti(ω).
Proof of the Remark: Let E be an event and ti(ω) be such that S(E)  Sti(ω). Since E =
(E ∩ Ai(E)) ∪ (E ∩ Ui(E)) and Ai(E) ∩ Ui(E) = ∅S(E), we have (E ∩ Ai(E)) ∩ (E ∩ Ui(E)) = ∅S(E).
Since ti(ω) is an additive probability measure, ti(ω)(E) = ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E)) + ti(ω)(E ∩ Ui(E)). Since
B
p
i Ui(E) = ∅S(E) for p ∈ (0,1] (BpU-Introspection in Proposition 8), we must have ti(ω)(E∩Ui(E)) = 0.

We slightly abuse terminology and call a probability measure µi ∈ ∆(S) a prior for player i on S
if for every event E ∈ Σ with S(E)  S equation (2u) is satisﬁed, i.e.,
µi(E ∩ S ∩ Ai(E)) =
Z
S∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dµi(·). (5)
The following lemma says that if there is a prior on a state-space then the marginal on a lower space
is a prior as well.
Lemma 2 If µi ∈ ∆(S0) is a prior for player i on S0 and S  S0, then (µi)|S (the marginal of µi on
S) is a prior for player i on S.
Proof of the Lemma. Let E be an event with S(E)  S and let µ be individual i’s probability
measure on S0 with S0  S. Since (µ)|S is a probability measure on S, (µ)|S(Ai(E)∩E) = (µ)|S(Ai(E)∩
30E∩S) (we do not like to abuse notation for what follows). By the deﬁnition of the marginal, (µ)|S(Ai(E)∩
E ∩ S) = µ

(rS
0
S )−1(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)

. Since µ is a probability measure on S0 satisfying equation (5),
the fact that Ai(E) is an event, and Remark 2,
µ

(rS
0
S )−1(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)

=
Z
ω0∈Ai(E)∩S0
ti(ω0)

(rS
0
S )−1(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)

dµ(ω0).
By Property (1) of ti,
Z
ω0∈Ai(E)∩S0
ti(ω0)

(rS
0
S )−1(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)

dµ(ω0)
=
Z
ω0∈Ai(E)∩S0
ti(rS
0
S (ω0))(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)dµ(ω0).
By the deﬁnition of marginal,
Z
ω0∈Ai(E)∩S0
ti(rS
0
S (ω0))(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)dµ(ω0)
=
Z
ω∈Ai(E)∩S
ti(ω)(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S)d(µ)|S(ω)
= (µ)|S(Ai(E) ∩ E ∩ S) = (µ)|S(Ai(E) ∩ E).

We say that µ ∈ ∆(S) is a common prior on S if it is a prior on S for every player i ∈ I.
Remark 3 Let ˆ S be the upmost state space in the lattice S, and let (PS
i )S∈S ∈
Q
S∈S ∆(S) be a tuple
of probability measures. Then (PS
i )S∈S is a prior for player i if and only if P
ˆ S
i is a prior for player i
on ˆ S and PS
i is the marginal of P
ˆ S
i for every S ∈ S.
This remark together with Lemma 2 implies the following:
Remark 4 A common prior (Deﬁnition 10) induces a common prior on S, for any S ∈ S. The converse
is not necessarily true unless S is the upmost state-space of the lattice. Note that it is possible that players
have diﬀerent priors, but at some space S (below the upmost space) the priors on S coincide. Hence, in
such a case they have diﬀerent priors, but a common prior on S (and by Lemma 2 also a common prior
on spaces less expressive than S).
We are now ready to prove Proposition 6. In fact, we prove below a version just requiring the
existence of a common prior PS on S such that S(G)  S and PS(CB1(
T
i∈I[ti(G) = pi])) > 0. By
Remark 4, this is more general than the statement of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 9, ω ∈ CB(F) if and only if there exists an event E that
is evident such that ω ∈ E ⊆ B1(F).
Since for an evident E we have E ⊆ B1
i (E) ⊆ Ai(E) for all i ∈ I. It follows that PS(E ∩ Ai(E)) =
PS(E) for S  S(E). Set F =
T
i∈I[ti(G) = pi] and let E = CB(F). By Proposition 1, S(E) = S(G).
By Lemma 2 and the properties imposed on ti, we consider w.l.o.g. a common prior PS(G) on S(G).
PS(G)(E) =
Z
S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dPS(G)(·)
31=
Z
E∩S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dPS(G)(·) +
Z
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(E)dPS(G)(·).
Z
E∩S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dPS(G)(·) =
Z
E∩S(G)∩Ai(E)
1dPS(G)(·) = PS(G)(E).
It follows that
Z
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(E)dPS(G)(·) = 0. (6)
Z
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
ti(·)(G)dPS(G)(·) =
Z
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
pidPS(G)(·) = piPS(G)(E)
Z
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
ti(·)(G)dPS(G)(·) =
Z
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dPS(G)(·)
=
Z
S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dPS(G)(·) −
Z
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dPS(G)(·)
Since by the monotonicity of probability measures
Z
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dPS(G)(·) ≤
Z
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(E)dPS(G)(·),
we must have by equation (6) and non-negativity of probability measures
Z
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dPS(G)(·) = 0.
Note that PS(G)(G ∩ E) =
R
S(G)∩Ai(E) ti(·)(G ∩ E)dPS(G)(·).
Note further that PS(G)(E) = PS(G)(E ∩ Ai(E)) for all i ∈ N since E = CB1(F) ⊆ Ai(E) for all
i ∈ N. Similarly, PS(G)(G ∩ E) = PS(G)(G ∩ E ∩ Ai(E)) for all i ∈ N.
Thus
piPS(G)(E) = PS(G)(G ∩ E). (7)
Note that by assumption PS(G)(E) > 0.
Since equation (7) holds for all i ∈ I, we must have pi = pj, for all i,j ∈ I. 
C.10 Proof of Theorem 1
Before we prove the theorem, we state following observations:
Remark 5 If P =
 
PS
S∈S ∈
Q
S∈S ∆(S) is a non-degenerate (common) prior, then also PS ∈ ∆(S)
is non-degenerate (common) prior on S for every S ∈ S.
Remark 6 If µi ∈ ∆(S) is a non-degenerate prior for player i on S and S0  S, then the marginal of
µi on S0,
 
µS
i

|S0 is a non-degenerate prior for player i on S0.
Lemma 3 Let PS be a non-degenerate common prior on some ﬁnite state-space S and let i ∈ I and
ω ∈ Σ such that ti (ω) ∈ 4(S). Then we have for all ω0 ∈ [ti (ω)] ∩ S that ti (ω)({ω0}) =
P
S({ω
0})
P S([ti(ω)]∩S).
32Proof of the Lemma. Because ti (ω) = ti (ω0), we have Ai
 
S↑
= Ai

{ω0}
↑

⊇ [ti (ω)]
↑ ⊇
{ω0}
↑. By the deﬁnition of a prior on S, PS ({ω0}) = PS

{ω0}
↑ ∩ Ai

{ω0}
↑

=
R
Ai({ω0}↑)∩S
ti (·)

{ω0}
↑

dPS (·).
Note that if ω00 ∈ S \ [ti (ω)] ∩ S, then we do have ti (ω00)

{ω0}
↑

= 0. Hence, since ti (ω) =
ti (ω00), for ω00 ∈ [ti (ω)], we have
R
Ai({ω0}↑)∩S
ti (·)

{ω0}
↑

dPS (·) =
R
[ti(ω)]∩S
ti (·)({ω0})dPS (·) =
ti (ω)({ω0})PS ([ti (ω)] ∩ S). Because PS is non-degenerate, it follows that ti (ω)({ω0}) =
P
S({ω
0})
P S([ti(ω)]∩S).

Proof of the Theorem. Note that E>α
1 and E
≤α
2 may not be events in our unawareness belief
structure. In Meier and Schipper (2007) we extend the deﬁnition of the belief operator as well as
Proposition 7 and 9 to measurable subsets of Ω.
Suppose that CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

is non-empty. Then ﬁx a -minimal state-space S such that W :=
CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩ S 6= ∅. Such a space S exists by the ﬁniteness of Σ.
By Remark 5, since P is non-degenerate common prior, PS is a non-degenerate common prior on S.
Since W = CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩ S ⊆ S ∩ B1
i

CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

, the minimality of S implies that
for each ω ∈ CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩ S we do have Sti(ω) = S and ti (ω)(W) = 1.
By the deﬁnition, ti (ω)([ti (ω)] ∩ S) = 1, for each ω ∈ CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩ S. Since ti(ω)(W) = 1,
we have ti (ω)(([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \ W) = 0.
By Lemma 3, this implies that PS ({ω0}) = 0, for ω0 ∈ ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)\W such that ω ∈ CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩
S. It follows that PS (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \ W) = 0 and hence, PS (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) ∩ W) = PS (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) ∩ W)+
PS (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \ W) = PS (([ti (ω)] ∩ S)) > 0. So, we do have PS (W) > 0.
The fact that PS ({ω0}) = 0, for ω0 ∈ ([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \ W such that ω ∈ CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩
S = W implies the following: For any random variable x, we have
P
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S x(ω0)PS ({ω0}) =
P
ω0∈W∩[ti(ω)]∩S x(ω0)PS ({ω0}), if [ti (ω)] ∩ W 6= ∅. And also
P
ω∈W x(ω)PS ({ω}) =
P
[ti(ω)]∩W6=∅
P
ω∈[ti(ω)]∩S x(ω)PS ({ω}). This is so, because there is a ω ∈ [ti (ω)] ∩ W and for this ω,
we do have ω ∈ CB

E>α
1 ∩ E
≤α
2

∩S and [ti (ω)] = [ti (ω)] and this implies PS (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \ W) = 0.
For i = 1,2 we have
X
ω∈W
PS ({ω})
X
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω0)ti (ω)({ω0})
=
X
ω∈W
PS ({ω})
X
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω0)
PS ({ω0})
PS ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
X
[ti(ω)]∩W6=∅
X
ω∈[ti(ω)]∩S
PS ({ω})
X
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω0)
PS ({ω0})
PS ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
X
[ti(ω)]∩W6=∅
X
ω∈[ti(ω)]∩S
PS ({ω})
X
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω0)
PS ({ω0})
PS ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
X
[ti(ω)]∩W6=∅
PS ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
X
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω0)
PS ({ω0})
PS ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
33=
X
[ti(ω)]∩W6=∅
X
ω0∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω0)PS ({ω0})
=
X
ω0∈W
v (ω0)PS ({ω0}).
But by the assumptions, we have
P
ω∈W PS ({ω})
P
ω0∈[t1(ω)]∩S v (ω0)t1 (ω)({ω0}) > αPS (W) and
P
ω∈W PS ({ω})
P
ω0∈[t2(ω)]∩S v (ω0)t2 (ω)({ω0}) ≤ αPS (W), a contradiction, since PS (W) > 0. 
References
[1] Ahn, D. and H. Ergin (2006). Unawareness and framing, mimeo.
[2] Aumann, R. (1976). Agreeing to disagree, Annals of Statistics 4, 1236-1239.
[3] ˇ Copiˇ c, J. and A. Galeotti (2006). Awareness as an equilibrium notion: Normal-form games, mimeo.
[4] Dekel, E., Lipman, B. and A. Rustichini (1998). Standard state-space models preclude unawareness,
Econometrica 66, 159-173.
[5] Ewerhart, C. (2001). Heterogeneous awareness and the possibility of agreement, mimeo.
[6] Fagin, R. and J. Halpern (1988). Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 34,
39-76.
[7] Feinberg, Y. (2005). Games with incomplete awareness, mimeo.
[8] Feinberg, Y. (2004). Subjective reasoning - games with unawareness, mimeo.
[9] Gadamer, H.-G. (1960). Wahrheit und Methode, J. C. B. Mohr, T¨ ubingen, (engl. transl., Truth and
Methode, 2nd edition, Crossroad, New York, 1989).
[10] Geanakoplos, J. (1989). Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and con-
sensus, mimeo.
[11] Grant, S. and J. Quiggin (2006). Learning and discovery, mimeo.
[12] Halpern, J. (2001). Alternative semantics for unawareness, Games and Economic Behavior 37,
321-339.
[13] Halpern, J. and L. Rˆ ego (2006). Extensive games with possibly unaware players, in: Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, forthcoming.
[14] Halpern, J. and L. Rˆ ego (2005). Interactive unawareness revisited, in: Theoretical Aspects of Ra-
tionality and Knowledge: Proc. Tenth Conference (TARK 2005).
[15] Harsanyi, J. (1967/68). Games with incomplete information played ‘Bayesian’ players, Part I, II,
and II, Management Science 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
[16] Heifetz, A., Meier, M. and B. C. Schipper (2006a). Interactive unawareness, Journal of Economic
Theory 130, 78-94.
[17] Heifetz, A., Meier, M. and B. C. Schipper (2006b). A canonical model for interactive unawareness,
mimeo.
[18] Hu H. and H. W. Stuart, Jr. (2001). An epistemic analysis of the Harsanyi transformation, Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory 30, 517-525.
[19] Li, J. (2006a). Information structures with unawareness, mimeo.
[20] Li, J. (2006b). Dynamic games with perfect awareness information, mimeo.
34[21] Meier, M. and B. C. Schipper (2007). Appendix to unawareness, beliefs and games: Speculative
trade under unawareness - the inﬁnite case, mimeo.
[22] Mertens, J.F. and S. Zamir (1985). Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete
information, International Journal of Game Theory 14, 1-29.
[23] Milgrom, P. and N. Stokey (1982). Information, trade and common knowledge, Journal of Economic
Theory 26, 17-27.
[24] Modica, S. (2000). The unawareness principle, priors and posteriors, mimeo.
[25] Modica, S. and A. Rustichini (1999). Unawareness and partitional information structures, Games
and Economic Behavior 27, 265-298.
[26] Modica, S. and A. Rustichini (1994). Awareness and partitional information structures, Theory and
Decision 37, 107-124.
[27] Monderer, D. and D. Samet (1989). Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs, Games
and Economic Behavior 1, 170-190.
[28] Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 36, 48-49.
[29] Sadzik, T. (2006). Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs, mimeo.
[30] Samet, D. (1998). Common priors and separation of convex sets, Games and Economic Behavior
24, 172-174.
[31] Simon, R. (2003). Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equi-
libria, Israel Journal of Mathematics 138, 73-92.
35